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Introduction
It is a testimony to how much international criminal justice has
become an established feature of the international system that we have now
reached a stage where the issue is typically no longer whether persons suspected of international crimes should be judged, but the finer points of
how they should be judged. This points to a thorough "normalization" of
international criminal justice, a far cry from the discipline's early epic days
where the case for the very idea of criminal repression had to be made
incessantly.
One question that is bound to arise increasingly as part of this process
t Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto. Although pursuing a
different line of thought, this article draws from research conducted as part of my Ph.D.
thesis which was made possible by funding from the Education Ministry of the French
Republic.
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of normalization is whether "international criminals"1 should be judged by
domestic or international courts. This is an issue that seems saturated
with not only complex policy challenges but also barely-hidden ideological
implications. Sovereignty is obviously a pressing concern, and there will
be a desire, even by those broadly committed to the fight against impunity,
to ensure that it is not brushed aside lightly. At the same time, international criminal justice is also the arena where some of the more utopian
aspirations of international lawyers play out, and one where there is a significant clamour for resorting to international institutions as such, if only
to give credibility to the idea that there is an "actual" international community backing criminal sanctions.
This is not, however, an issue that has attracted considerable or systematic theoretical attention. International lawyers, of course, have not
missed the strictly legal part of that problematique. Particularly, once international criminal tribunals exist, the problem is one of jurisdiction or
receivability which is governed by precise legal rules. For example, the
rules of "primacy" and "complementarity" seek to allocate cases between
international criminal tribunals and domestic courts. When cases will be
brought to the International Criminal Court (ICC), the issue of whether
they should be judged by that court or by national jurisdictions will no
longer be one of general policy, but one of the application of a complex
receivability mechanism.
Much of the issue of which tribunals should judge persons suspected
of international crimes, however, is not strictly legal. Aside from the legal
regime of case allocation in any given jurisdictional regime, the prosecutor
still has to make decisions about who to prosecute. These decisions have a
strong or, indeed, even stronger bearing on who gets prosecuted by what
tribunal than the purely legal part of that regime. In a regime of primacy,
that decision will be final, and in a regime of complementarity, it will only
be a first step towards determining the issue. In both cases, however, it is a
decision that predates the application of the legal rule of allocation. Going
further back in time and given that we have an international criminal tribunal, we also need a determination that primacy or complementarity or any
other regime is the most appropriate one in the first place. This is not a
legal determination per se, and generally one that is left to political negotiations. Finally, for the problem of choice between international criminal
tribunals and domestic courts to arise at all, we need the decision to have
been made that an international criminal tribunal should exist in a given
context (presumably some domestic courts are always available), a decision which again is a major decision of principle or politics, rather than a
legal one.
1. 1 will use this as shorthand for "persons suspected of crimes under international
law." By "international criminals," I do not mean to imply that these individuals' crimes
are of an interstate nature, or that they should particularly be judged by international
criminal tribunals, or, obviously, that they are necessarily guilty of the crimes they are
accused of.
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Although not absent from the literature, these issues have not been
treated in much scholarly depth. There are, of course, many historical
explanations of why international criminal tribunals, or a certain regime of
allocation, have been chosen in a certain case. Indeed, most of the time it
seems that the decisions were largely ad hoc and political, depending on
Great Power convergence, the necessities of the time, or various other nonprincipled circumstances. As a result, the scholarship is overwhelmingly
descriptive in scope and in particular fails to link up with scholarship of a
more normative nature on the fundamental nature of international criminal justice. All in all, there has not been any significant theoretical attention devoted to the fundamental reasons why one would want to have an
individual tried by international criminal tribunals rather than domestic
courts.
In this paper I want to try to remedy this flaw by suggesting a "representational theory," a critical and normative theory of what tribunals international criminals should be tried by. The theory is critical in that it seeks
to provide a tool or standpoint whereby certain choices of the international
community can be criticized. It is normative in that it is only interested in
developing a "just" theory of which tribunals should try international
criminals, in a tradition of ethical thinking about the law. I am not interested, therefore, in whether the theory is realistic or would provide a prescriptive potion that might stand a chance of being absorbed by the
international community. Nor am I interested in whether the theory adequately describes how the international community has actually ever made
such decisions. I am well aware that many decisions about who should
judge whom have depended on things as trivial as who caught whom, who
occupied whom, or who could be bothered to organize what. I do see the
theory as being hermeneutic, however, in that it seeks to tease out what I
believe is at least one implicit and somewhat "enlightened" understanding
that the international community has about what it does when it chooses
who should judge international criminals (even though it may not be aware
of it).
In its simplest form, the "representational" theory asserts that persons
tried for international crimes should be tried by tribunals that adequately
"represent" the nature of the crimes at stake. In other words, there should
be as much correspondence as possible between the nature of crimes and
the nature of institutions judging them. The representational theory of
international criminal justice, in other words, is as much a call to think
about international criminal justice as it is a call to think about the nature
of international crimes.
Although as a matter of generality this might seem the most obvious
thing to say, it is of course precisely not the normative ground on which
decisions about what types of tribunals should judge whom have been
made. In order to prove that the "representational theory" makes more
sense of our intuitions about "good" international criminal justice, I will
begin by showing what the actual principles used by the international community have been and what crucial dimension is lost by resorting to these.
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In Part I, I briefly show how the international community at times has
operated under the belief that international tribunals should be the proper
venue for trials of international criminals. In Part II, I show how the idea
that domestic courts should be the preferred solution for international trials, except when domestic courts are unavailable (complementarity), has
since solidified into the international consensus. I also try to show, however, what the risks are of overinvesting in domestic trials, even when these
might be entirely in good faith and respect due process. In Part III, I seek
to construe the problem of what tribunals should judge what cases as a
fundamental problem of "ownership," and as a problem of how given
crimes relate to a given society. In Part IV, I illustrate the proper way to
construe international criminal trials as giving an adequate symbolic "representation" of those being affected by the crimes if "ownership" and giving each "owner" its due are the key concern of international criminal
justice. In Part V, I argue that neither primacy nor complementarity allow
us to do this because they present trials by domestic or international
courts as incommensurable alternatives. Instead, I propose a "strong" normative defense of hybrid tribunals, not only as a symptom of tribunal
fatigue and as a second best solution, but as a radically different approach
to the role of international criminal justice that makes most sense of the
"representational" function of trials. Finally, in Part VI, I seek to apply
these theoretical insights by looking at how the trials of Saddam Hussein
and Slobodan Milogevit, the focus of this symposium, might be perceived.
I.

Trials by International Tribunals and Misplaced Universalism

The minority position these days is the 'idea that international
criminals, at least the major ones, should really be first and foremost tried
by international criminal tribunals, even if domestic courts are working.
This vision of international criminal justice is evidenced in all four ad hoc
international criminal tribunals: the Nuremberg tribunal, the Tokyo tribunal, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).
There are several solid arguments in favor of recourse to international
criminal tribunals. One of them is that by virtue of their externality, international trials create an objective distance between judges and judged,
which makes it possible for them to render more authoritative judgments.
Ruti Teitel, for example, argues that "[t]he transitional normative message
is most clearly expressed through the international legal order, as its
strengths are a normative machinery with the capacity to comprehend
extraordinary political violence deployed outside the ordinary legal
order."'2 Several of the goals that international criminal justice seeks to
advance may stand a better chance of being achieved if pursued by international criminal tribunals. International trials have a broader reach. They
impress on more people the fact that the crimes committed were indeed
atrocious and are therefore likely, all other things being equal, to have a
2.

RUTI

TEITEL,

TRANsInoNAL JUSTICE 30 (2000).
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significant global effect.
The problem is that a systematic resort to international criminal tribunals is unrealistic. It is unrealistic partly because the international community cannot take on all of the world's international crimes, and because
there is a simple logistical problem at stake which makes some choice unavoidable. The deeper problem with systematic resort to international trials,
however, is that it clashes head on with the idea of sovereignty. This is a
practical problem since any international project that fails to take into
account the crucial dimension of sovereignty is unlikely to achieve much.
But it is also, to the extent that sovereignty is about more than sheer power
and embodies certain normative commitments itself, a normative problem.
Indeed, it is for this reason principally that the idea of primacy was
rejected in the Rome Conference. States decided that they were simply not
ready to accept in the ordinary circumstances of the international system
what they had been willing to accept in situations of occupation (Nuremberg, Tokyo) or in situations of Security Council intervention (ICTY,
ICTR). Moreover, linked to a defence of sovereignty is a critique of the
"international" as at once remote, inefficient and costly. On the whole,
therefore, systematic resort to international criminal tribunals can be portrayed as simultaneously unrealistic, normatively unsound, and pragmatically counterintuitive.
4
But apart from the strict issue of the absence of sovereign consent,
there is a deeper problem with systematic resort to international criminal
tribunals than their rootedness in a given societal context, and it is the way
the tribunals have placed excessive emphasis on the internationality of the
crimes committed. What if crimes have been committed almost entirely
within the bounds of one society? Is it legitimate for the international community to claim a case for itself regardless of local demands for transitional
justice? Even if the crimes at stake have an international or transnational
context, it is likely that the majority of the victims will be located within
one society. Is there not a risk that an international trial will partly ignore
this "majority interest" that a certain society has in an episode of historical
and often traumatic suffering?
Most international crimes, despite international variables, also have
broadly domestic roots and can only be understood by reference to political projects that took form within a given polity. It is unlikely that international trials will, all other things being equal, be as effective at
3. Note that this argument merely involves accepting that international criminal
trials are likely to have a marginally bigger deterrent effect than domestic trials, rather
than a significant deterrent effect.
4. In theory and albeit indirectly, there was always consent by the successor states
of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda to the creation and operation of the corresponding
ad hoc international criminal tribunals in the sense that these states, as members of the
United Nations (U.N.), had always agreed "in advance" to comply with whatever compulsory decisions the Security Council might take. What I mean is an "erosion" rather than
a "violation" of these states' sovereignty in the sense that, notwithstanding that formal
consent, the operation of the international criminal tribunals is necessarily affecting the
way these states' sovereignty is seen.
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comprehending the complex domestic and social causes that led to the
crimes and at giving an account of them.
In light of this, international trials tend to create too great a distance
between the place where the crime was committed and the place where it is
judged. This distance is partly symbolic. International trials uproot the
crime from the place where it was committed. It is also a "legal distance"
in that the crimes will be judged largely according to international norms
which, in their abstractness, may have little connection with local legal reality. The impact on transitional justice and the ability of the international
community to provide meaningful avenues for healing and redress will be
diminished.
The critique of the excessive universalism of international criminal
tribunals 5 is one that is well established by now, is well taken, and in fact
has almost come to represent the discipline's mainstream to the point of
risking being overdone. Rather than hammer this point, I want to see what
is lost by embracing the opposite view, namely that domestic trials should
really always be the obvious, a priori route for trials of international
criminals. In other words, although I retain much of what might be called
the "communitarian" critique of international criminal justice, I also want
to engage in the more delicate exercise of a defence of what I would
describe as internationalcriminal trials' necessary cosmopolitanism.

II. Trials by Domestic Courts and the Risk of Discarding
Universalism
For many of the sound reasons outlined above, the international community has gradually moved towards asserting a strong bias in favor of
domestic prosecutions. The concept here is that domestic trials are a priori
always to be favored, 6 and that trials should be international only to the
extent that domestic courts have been shown to fail quite significantly.
This is what one might refer to as the "idea of complementarity." It is an
idea which goes far beyond the ICC's receivability rule 7 and can be seen
more generally as the prioritization of domestic prosecutions, whether in
the context of existing tribunals or in efforts at devising entirely new judicial solutions.
This is a welcome move generally and a sound reaction to what was
clearly an excessive push in the other direction. It is also a move for which
international lawyers can at least not be suspected of thrusting their exper5. Jose E. Alvarez's brilliant Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda, is
in my opinion probably the definitive-certainly the most rhetorically potent-statement
of this view in the 1990s. 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 365 (1999).
6. See William W. Burke-White, A Community of Courts: Toward a System of International Criminal Law Enforcement, 24 MICR. J. INT'L L. 1, 87 (2002) ("From a normative
perspective, national courts in the State where crimes occur are the preferable enforcement mechanisms.").
7. As articulated in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 17,
July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/rome
fra.htm.
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tise on a type of problem that at times only warrants a marginal intervention from them.8 Complementarity also makes more sense of sovereignty
and, even though one may not want it to be an end in itself, it is still, all
other things being equal, a positive development. Domestic trials will be
more functional, faster and cheaper, operating as they do on the basis of
existing courts and law. Most importantly, it is likely that domestic trials
will have a greater transitional impact and shape the law closer to those
who then have to live with it.
Notwithstanding, the rush to an exclusive emphasis on domestic trials
except in the case of the failure of domestic courts also seems to be in
danger of being taken too far. The problem with complementarity is not
with all of the above very clear advantages, but with what the systematic
bias in favor of domestic courts may obscure in some cases. Indeed, the
problem is when this very pragmatic discourse, from a concession to the
politically achievable and a recognition of the priority claims of populations affected by horrendous crimes, becomes reified into simply an unsophisticated apology for sovereignty. It is this reification of sovereignty that,
I argue, can ultimately be very much at odds with the fundamental spirit of
international criminal justice.
Of course, complementarity will create opportunities for a court like
the ICC to exercise jurisdiction on the basis of the dysfunction of domestic
courts, so that complementarity certainly does not mean the abandonment
of all international trials. 9 But the problem is that it is not clear that these
are the only occasions when international tribunals should really aspire to
exercise jurisdiction. It may well be that complementarity will often prevent international criminal tribunals like the ICC from exercising jurisdiction in cases where arguably an international trial would make sense,
notwithstanding the existence of functional domestic courts. Indeed, complementarity might even force tribunals to exercise jurisdiction in cases
where they do not and should not want to do so. Complementarity may
mean too much of a good thing.
First, there is the minor problem that whether domestic courts will be
a better avenue for prosecutions of international crimes really depends on
which domestic courts we are talking about. The discourse of complementarity does not distinguish between different states' courts. In particular,
the Rome Statute seems to assume that trials based on universal jurisdiction, by virtue of their being domestic, are always preferable to international trials.
8. For the related critique of international criminal justice being more generally
obsessed with the international in ways that may be sometimes fundamentally self-serving sociologically, see my attempt at a Bourdieusian analysis of the "ICC ideology" in
the conclusion of Frederic Mgret, Three Dangersfor the InternationalCriminal Court:A
Critical Look at a Consensual Project. 12 FINNISH Y.B. INT'L L. 191 (2001).
9. It is worth noting, however, that the logic of complementarity, especially according to many of its advocates, is that ideally the ICC will never have any cases to judge
because complementarity and the threat of forfeiture of jurisdiction will have strongly
incited states to carry out prosecutions domestically over which they have control.
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It is far from clear, however, that this should be the case. Trials on the
basis of universal jurisdiction are an interesting stopgap measure when no
other domestic court is available, but they remain very problematic for
numerous reasons, such as risks of political interference and distance.
Strikingly, while the discourse of complementarity often claims to be more
rooted in respect for sovereignty and the core values of the international
legal order, it may well be that states would consider that trials on the basis
of universal jurisdiction are in fact more offensive to and dangerous for
dominant concepts of sovereignty than trials which at least have the legitimacy and imprimatur of the international community.
This, however, is a secondary problem. The main point I want to make
is the more radical one that even if the courts involved are those of a state
that is directly and effectively affected by the crime (e.g. the state whose
nationals committed the crime on whose territory and against whose
nationals the crimes were committed) and even where these function perfectly, an exclusive preference for domestic trials is something that is not as
obvious normatively as the defenders of complementarity make it to be.
Rather than thinking in terms of the types of courts that might be
involved in the prosecution of international crimes, I think it is more useful
to think in terms of the types of international crimes that the international
community is dealing with. In order to do so, however, it is first necessary
to make a brief detour to understand one of the fundamental tensions of
international criminal justice.
A.

The Starting Point: The Idea of the "Schism" in International
Criminal Justice

International criminal law enforcement in an age of complementarity
relies on a curious paradox or schism. At the substantive level, we know
that crimes are properly called "international" by virtue of their source and
foundation being international. Crimes are international because they are
proclaimed as such and according to the international community's modes
of norm production (treaty, custom). Thus international crimes are unmistakably international regardless, for example, of the fact that they may also
be incorporated into domestic law. This incorporation is made only on the
authority, and according to the prescriptions, of international law.
The international community's choice at the level of enforcement is
markedly different. There the preferred option is to outsource the repression of international crimes, as a matter of priority, to domestic courts
and, in effect, to defer to sovereignty. As already indicated, there are many
good reasons why this is the case. But the result is an unmistakable tension, at least potentially and conceptually, between the centralized proclamative/legislative and the decentralized enforcement/judicial functions of
international criminal justice.
Most of the time, that schism will not be readily apparent or at least
not particularly problematic and simply reflect the nature of the international system--one sufficiently centralized to proclaim international
crimes with one voice but too fragmented and polarized to commit firmly
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to centralized international prosecutions. It is hard not to see, however,
how in the long run the (partly) dual track pursued by the international
community may occasionally create some fundamental conceptual dissonance. This dissonance results from situations where, fundamentally, the
consequences (domestic trials) might contradict the premises (the universal nature of international crimes).
It is important in this respect to emphasize or rediscover the oft forgotten fact that there are, and have been historically, many good reasons why
one may want international trials that have nothing to do with the fact that
domestic courts are dysfunctional. In that respect, the discourse of complementarity risks impoverishing our mental lexicon to deal with the richness of issues involved. The problem with the systematic preference for
domestic courts is that it treats all international crimes alike, when a valid
case exists that some crimes would clearly be more worthy of being tried
internationally. There are in my mind two types of international crimes
where the gap between the substantive and the enforcement dimensions of
international criminal justice becomes so apparent as to suggest that there
is something deeply problematic about delegating repression of international crimes to domestic courts.
B. International Criminal Tribunals and "Transnational" or
"Multinational" Crimes
The "international" in "international crimes" most clearly refers to the
fact that the source of the crimininalization of these crimes is international
law. It is not as such an indication that there is something specifically
international, in the sense of factually involving several states for example,
about the crimes in question. In fact, an international law crime might be
entirely domestic. But nor is the possibility that an international crime
might be actually international excluded. An international crime may very
well be international, for example, in the sense of involving relations
between states (aggression, war crimes committed in an international
armed conflict) or holding some multinational (perpetrator and victim of
different nationalities) or transnational (crime involving outside assistance, crime committed abroad) element. In fact, it is rare that the commission of massive crimes will have been entirely contained within borders.
The obvious example here is the crimes of the Nazis during World War II
which were thoroughly international in every sense of the word. The war
was waged over dozens of countries and made victims in countless territories; the implementation of the Holocaust involved many crossings of borders and foreign complicities.
In this context, it is interesting to note that trials before domestic
courts are invariably presented as more respectful of both sovereignty and
the "victim society's" transitional needs for example. It is true that an international trial of an individual whose crimes were committed exclusively
domestically is the kind of case where the claims for an international trial
will be at their weakest. There would be a strong argument in the case of
the Khmer genocide, for example, that, all other things being equal, a
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Cambodian court would be the most suitable in view of the largely endogenous nature of the crimes committed.
But the same hardly holds true of crimes that are "literally" international. In cases where several states have a keen interest in exercising jurisdiction, leaving the trial to one domestic court will inevitably frustrate the
aspiration of others in a way that is fundamentally in contradiction with
sovereignty. Let us imagine, for the sake of example, that after World War
II there had been the strong bias in favor of domestic courts that is now
evidenced by the idea of complementarity. Who should Goering have been
tried by? Complementarity would have recommended that a domestic
court--any domestic court presumably as long as it was willing and
able--should have taken up the task.
It is not hard to see, however, how such a choice would have turned
out to be profoundly suboptimal. First, it would have been extremely difficult to find a just and equitable formula of forum conveniens. Who should
take precedence? The state that has most victims? The state whose nationality the offender is from so that it can effect its own democratic transition?
In practice, Goering might well have been judged by whatever nation
caught him first, for example the United States or the Soviet Union.
Although such a trial would clearly be better than nothing (and for the sake
of argument we assume that it would have been conducted according to fair
trial procedures), it is not hard to see how it might have had significant
flaws. It is most likely that a domestic court would have emphasized the
purely domestic component of his crimes. Even if an attempt had been
made at trying crimes that had occurred elsewhere, these crimes would
have not necessarily been judged from one very specific perspective. Even
if an American court had done its best to take into account crimes committed on the Russian front as well as those committed against U.S. soldiers,
for example, it is quite clear that resulting judgments would have been
tainted by various national prejudices.
Nor could this bias be easily corrected by simply handing Goering
over to a succession of various domestic courts. The problem is that the
exercise of jurisdiction by one state would most likely have frustrated the
exercise of jurisdiction by other states. This would be vividly the case if
the state in question decided to impose the death penalty, but even a long
prison sentence could significantly reduce the prospect of one or several
trials abroad. Even though the principle does not apply strictly from one
state to another, furthermore, all kinds of non bis in idem problems would
have not failed to arise as a result of overlap between the constituent elements of various crimes. This is of course assuming that the state that had
conducted the first trials was in a position to or wanted to extradite or
transfer the individual in question, something that is unlikely. Both the
sovereign and the societies who had not had the chance to intercept Goering would thus have been arbitrarily deprived of an opportunity for the
former to defend its public order and for the latter to experience first hand
an account of how the crimes had occurred.
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Moreover, even if such multiple trials had been possible, the image of
the worst Nazi crimes that would have emerged as a result would have been
a highly disaggregated one, incapable of making sense of the unifying complexity of the crimes involved. Different courts might have disagreed on
common elements; connections and parallels would have been obscured.
When it comes to massive episodes of international criminality, it must be
recognized that the total is clearly more than the sum of the parts, and no
useful purpose is served by breaking up an overall pattern of systemic
criminality into select instances of that criminality.
In such cases only international trials can do justice to the transnational complexity of events that have many dimensions to them. In the
case of major war criminals of World War II, resorting to international
criminal trials such as the ones organized in Nuremberg and Tokyo helped
to solve a problem of competing jurisdiction that would otherwise have
plagued the entire enterprise by safeguarding the interests of all states
involved. 10 This was a case where even today one would have to agree that
complementarity could not be the end of the matter.
C.

International Crimes and the Nature and Function of International
Criminal Law

Can a case in favor of international trials be made more generally,
even in cases where there are no competing assertions for jurisdiction and
an international law crime does not have a factually international dimension? Here the argument becomes naturally more tenuous, as one has to
leave the safe shores of the defence of sovereignty to argue from a necessarily more cosmopolitan notion of international criminal justice.
The point, though, is that even in cases of crimes without a transnational dimension a crucial dimension may be lost by systematically resorting to purely domestic trials, except when a failure of domestic courts can
be demonstrated. There are both minor and major reasons why this is so.
A minor reason is that permanent outsourcing to domestic courts may simply result in discrepancies in the substantive law, as international criminal
law is incorporated, interpreted, and applied in ways that inevitably vary
from one country to the other, a point recognized early on by Kelsen" or
in various preparatory memos to Nuremberg for example. 1 2 Although
10. This is something obvious but that is only exceptionally picked up in the literature despite the very significant precedent of the Nuremberg tribunal for example. See
William N.Gianaris, The New World Order and the Need for an International Criminal
Court, 16 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 88, 110 (1992) (pointing out that "[a]n international criminal court would also be useful where two or more states have concurrent jurisdiction
and cannot agree on the correct forum state. Thus, where the accused has committed
several distinct offenses in two or more states that constitute concerted criminal activity,
an international criminal court would more effectively consolidate all the charges in one
forum.").
11. "If war criminals are subjected to various national courts ... it is very likely that
these courts will result in conflicting decisions and varying penalties." HANs KELSEN,
PEACE THROUGH LAW 112 (1944).
12. Colonel Murray C. Bernays, G-1, Subject: Trial of European War Criminals, in THE
AMERICAN ROAD TO NUREMBERG: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD 1944-1945 31 (Bradley F.
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international criminal law is clearly fully compatible with some measure of
national margin of appreciation, the credibility of the law will be affected
by major contradictions.
Complementarity, however, does not allow any internationalization in
cases where a domestic court may otherwise interpret international law in
a way that is clearly in contradiction with international jurisprudence, or
where it would simply make sense, on account of the importance and novelty of an issue, for it to be assessed by an international bench. What
seems needed for the coherent development of international law, on the
contrary, is that every now and then, when an issue warrants that it be so,
trials be conducted that allow a centralization of the formulation of international law, regardless of the issue of the proper functioning of domestic
courts. 13 As one author pointed out in an article written during World

War 11 on prospects for trials following it, "courts in different countries
might apply even perfectly unified codes so differently that, ultimately, for
a number of cases ...

only an International Criminal Court could provide

an effective international forum."' 14 Kelsen also insists that
"[i]nternationalisation of the legal procedure against war criminals would
have the great advantage of making the punishment, to a certain extent,
5
uniform."'
Although the harmonious development of international law is probably a rather secondary goal in relation to the more concrete goal of effecting transitions in war-torn societies or simply respecting sovereignty, one
cannot fail to see that there is a powerful interest in the rationalization of
international criminal law which might occasionally deserve more recognition than the systematic privileging of domestic trials allows.
The second more important, but also more complex, reason why one
might want to internationalize prosecutions even when domestic courts are
able and willing is that in resorting systematically to domestic courts one
may end up losing or minimizing the sense that the crimes are international at all. Hannah Arendt had made this one of the central themes in her
critique of the Eichmann trial: "the very monstrousness of the events [was]
Smith ed., 1982) (pointing out, as an argument in favor of creating an international
tribunal, that "[tihe offenders will become subject to trial under many and divergent
codes and procedures. The applicable basic law, law as to justification (e.g., orders of
duly constituted superiors), procedures, and rules of evidence will vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction ....").
13. One might argue that the ability of domestic courts to rightly apply international
law is an issue of proper functioning of courts. In a way it is, but for a misapplication of
international law to justify the receivability of a case before the ICC under the complementarity regime it would have to manifest a clear unwillingness to try the individual in
question and therefore be grossly manifest. The international community may have an
interest in intervening judicially before one even gets to this stage to correct more subtle
but no less pernicious misinterpretations or "under-optimalizations" of the law which
may otherwise end up having significant precedential value.
14. A.G.D. Levy, The Law and Procedure of War Crime Trials, 37 Am. POL. Sci. REV.
1054, 1070-71 (1943).
15. KELSEN, supra note 11, at 112.
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,minimized' before a tribunal that represent[ed] one nation only." 16 As one
author put it, "[iln limiting jurisdiction to those offen[s]es committed
against either nationals or the interests of the state concerned or on the
territory of the prosecuting nation, this view tended to emphasize the protection of that state rather than of the international community."1 7 Purely
domestic trials can thus be accused of the same thing as purely international trials: that they deny one of the constitutive facets of international
crimes, as crimes that in the end are not international for naught. In the
same way that international crimes are never entirely international, nor are
they ever purely domestic.
In fact, there may be cases which, despite the fact that they occurred
within a state's territory, defy boundaries in a very real way: cases which,
by their magnitude, so threaten our sense of humanity that they belong to a
sort of "world heritage of pain." In such cases, it would seem to make
sense to argue that the international community should have an interest in
taking repression into its own hands, even when functional domestic
courts are available.
This is first because international criminal tribunals will probably do
a better job of "translating" what might at first be mistakenly construed as
purely domestic crimes into the purportedly universal language of international law. A good example of this is the work of the ICTR.' 8 Indeed, if
anything could be rescued of that tribunal's ever-problematic internationality, it is the fact that it probably has done more than any other institution
to show that the genocide in Rwanda was not simply an irreducible African
tribal specificity, but a crime amenable to international law's universalizing categorizations of abhorrent violence.
But it is also more crucial because it falls upon the international community, if it is to be taken seriously, to affirm its stake in an event that
threatens it as such. 19 For the international community not to do so would
make a mockery of the idea of crimes against humanity, or at least severely
expose the tensions implicit in the current model of international criminal
justice, in a way that would weaken the project's credibility.
There is a long line of thought that has been sensitive to how on some
occasions not resorting to international criminal tribunals might simply be
construed as an abdication of its responsibility by the international community and a failure to stand up to its values in a way that is commensurate with the horrors it claims to condemn. Renaud and Lapradelle, for
example, argued as early as 1919 that there would have been an "antinomy" between the nature of the crimes that Kaiser Wilhelm was accused of,
16. HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL 269
(1963).
17. Richard R. Baxter, The Municipaland InternationalLaw Basis of Jurisdictionover
War Crimes, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 382, 385 (1951) (emphasis added).

18. See generally Alvarez, supra note 5.
19. This is a point that very few authors make today. But see Burke-White's reference
to the "Milogevit exception": "Where a globally renowned despot is tried for international crimes, the world at large may have an interest in supranational prosecution."
Burke-White, supra note 6, at 93.

Cornell International Law Journal

Vol. 38

and the possibility that he could have been tried by a mere domestic
court. 20

One cannot fail to see how trying the world shattering crimes of

the Holocaust before a domestic court would have risked completely
defrauding history of at least an attempt at a specifically universalizing
narrative of the events at stake. 2 1 As Eagleton put it in the run up to
Nuremberg, "[t]he crimes committed are crimes against the United
Nations, indeed against all humanity; they are more than crimes against
any one national, and should not be open to punishment by any one
nation."' 22 The Rwanda tribunal is also an interesting case in point. The
creation of the ICTR is explained almost entirely as a result of the mechanics of Security Council decision making and the bad state of Rwandan
jurisdictions. But would it really have been conceivable to behave as if the
slaughter of 800,000 individuals in the space of three months was a local
event? In effect, it was Rwanda which, when before the Security Council,
claimed that recognition for itself arguing that "the genocide committed in
Rwanda is a crime against humankind and should be suppressed by the
23
internationalcommunity as a whole."
Nor is this merely a vue de l'esprit which can be accused of misplaced
universalism. As Robert Jackson put it, "[an attack on the foundations of
international relations cannot be regarded as anything less than a crime
against the international community" so that it "may properly vindicate the
integrity of its fundamental compacts by punishing aggressors."'2 4 Judge
R61ing of the Tokyo tribunal agreed: "[Flor the very reason that war crimes
are violations of the laws of war, that is of international law, an interna'25
tionaljudge should try the internationaloffences. He is the best qualified.
If we take the idea of "crimes against humanity" seriously, then we must
accept that occasionally the international community will be threatened
not simply metaphorically but concretely.
20. See F. Larnaude & A. De Lapradelle, Examen de la responsabilite penale de
l'empereur Guillaume II d'Allemagne, JouRNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 152 (1919)("[I1l y
aurait antinomie entre la nature du crime et le caractre du criminel d'une part, et la
nature juridique du tribunal d'autre part" si Guillaume ILetait juge par une juridiction
nationale. Ce serait meme "prendre la 'question Guillaume II' par un bien petit c6te, c'est
la rapetisser que de la ramener aux proportions d'une affaire de cour d'assises ou de
conseil de guerre.").
21. As it is, the Nuremberg tribunal of course did not make a very good job of it, but
it is highly likely that a domestic trial would have produced an even more distorted
vision of the events.
22. Clyde Eagleton, Punishment of War Criminals by the United Nations, 37 AM. J.
INT'L L. 496 (1943).

23. U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg. at 14, U.N.Doc. S/PV.3453 (Nov. 8, 1994)
(emphasis added) (statement of the Permanent Representative of Rwanda following the
voting). It is of course significant that Rwanda then rejected its own position by ultimately pleading for a reorientation in favor of domestic courts. Nonetheless, the fact
that it initially sought to invoke the international community's specific interest to legitimize the creation of an international court is revealing.
24.
TO THE

ROBERT H. JACKSON, REPORT OF ROBERT H. JACKSON: UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MILITARY TRIALS

53 (1945).

25. B. V. A. R61ing, The Law of War and the National Jurisdiction since 1945, 100
RECUEiL DES COURS [R.C.A.D.I.1 329, 354 (1960) (emphasis added).
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Even in cases where domestic courts are functioning, and even when
crimes
at stake involve no transnational dimension, there would still
the
a "pure" argument in favor of international trials for certain
to
be
seem
which
by their very human-bond shattering heinousness are absocrimes,
of
situations where the international community must rise to
instances
lute
the occasion, transcend its differences, and assert itself qua international
community.

III.

Conceptualizing the Relationship of Societies and Crime Through
the Idea of "Ownership"

At stake here behind both the problematic features of purely domestic
and purely international trials is the problem of determining who, of a
given society or the international community, has the most valid claim in
any one case. What this points to is a deeper difficulty in conceptualizing
the relationship between certain crimes and the social environment in
which they occur. One intriguing way of thinking about the issue is as one
of ownership. This may seem like a stark idea, but I want to use the metaphor of property rather than, for example, simply the idea of jurisdiction to
describe the strong sense of appropriation mixed with a feeling of entitlement that permeates debates about who should judge whom. Although
crime is obviously something that societies are keen to eliminate, it is also
curiously something about which they feel a strong sense of ownership,
especially when competing claims for jurisdiction arise. Many of the
debates on allocation of cases can and are thus often conceived in the language of property: 26 appropriation, confiscation, transfer (as of a title).
But what might it mean to take that circumlocution seriously? Who do
international crimes "belong" to? The domestic society in which they are
26. See Human Rights Watch, Saddam Hussein's Trial: BringingJusticefor the Human
Rights Crimes in Iraq's Past, BACKGROUNDERS, Dec. 2003, available at http://www.hrw.
org/english/docs/2003/12/19/iraq6770.htm ("When national authorities can hold fair
National judges and prosecuand effective trials, that is generally the best option ....
tors help create a feeling of 'ownership' of the important process of accountability.")
(emphasis added); The U.N. Criminal Tribunalsfor Yugoslavia and Rwanda: International
Justice or Show of Justice?: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on InternationalRelations, 107th
Cong. 107-71 (2002) (statement of Pierre-Richard Prosper, U.S. Ambassador-at-Large
for War Crimes Issues) ("In the years ahead, the United States will continue to lead the
We
fight to end impunity for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes ....
will continue to seek to bring justice as close as feasibly and credibly possible to the
victims in order to create a sense of ownership and involvement.") (emphasis added);
Kingsley Chiedu Moghalu, Saddam's Trial as Politics and Strategy, GLOBAL VIEWPOINT,
July 13, 2004, available at http://www.digitalnpq.org/global-services/global%20view
point/07-13-04.html ("Itihe effort to wrap Iraqi ownership around this victor's justice is
an important one, for it will help address the questions of legitimacy that will inevitably
arise as history is written-and rewritten-by the various parties to the conflict")
(emphasis added); Adama Dieng, Africa and the Globalization of Justice: Contributions
and Lessons from the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Paper Presented to
the Conference on Justice in Africa (July 30, 2001) ("Careful consideration should be
given to the question of ownership and contextual relevance of an international judicial
process.") (emphasis added).
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committed or the international community which made them crimes in the
first place?
There are no easy answers to these questions. One way of conceiving
"property" over a given case or case load is to make it dependent on some
assertion of a claim to property or effective control. In effect, sovereignty is
exactly that: a claim that anything occurring on one's territory or through
one's nationals in some way "belongs" to the state. More concretely, custody is also a concrete factor that seems to validate an otherwise nonspecific claim to judging a case. But that does not really tell us how to deal
with competing claims for property, particularly those emanating from the
international community. To say that cases simply "belong" to whoever
asserts jurisdiction over them, is to defer to power, violence, and chance,
hardly an appealing normative choice.
Rather, as in property law, the exercise of control must in all likelihood be perfected by a claim to authority, the recognition of a moral entitlement to claim control over a case. The problem here is not unlike some
private international law or conflict of jurisdiction issues. What is needed
a priori is some sort of nexus. Typically that nexus will be provided by the
traditional titles to jurisdiction: territory and personal, both active and passive. On a horizontal level, when the issue is to determine which of two
states should exercise jurisdiction or which of two states' law should be
applied, these titles provide some of the basic groundwork for more sophisticated rules of legal apportionment to apply. But the relationship of the
international to the domestic obviously occurs on a very different plane
than private international law, which is vertical in nature.
On that count the international community will always be on the losing side, since it obviously has no sovereignty, and no personal or territorial titles to call its own. The international community has no territory (at
least in the legal sense), or its territory is that of all member states metaphorically, which is not very helpful. There are no "citizens of the world,"
or at least no such concept legally that could help anchor a claim that the
international community had a direct enforceable interest in a given case.
And the international community is unlikely to directly secure custody
over individuals, at least so long as no state wants to transfer such custody
to it. Sovereignty still seems to structure our moral understanding of the
world.
If some ownership by the international community of some international crimes is going to be justified it must be on a more abstract level. It
may seem odd to speak of the international community's "ownership" of
certain crimes, when that expression is most often used to describe the
situation of civil society. But I use it purposefully here because, as I hope
to have shown, the international community can actually claim to have a
certain "ownership" of its own as regards some international crimes.
Here the emphasis has to be not on the circumstances of the commission of the crimes (and hence territory or nationality) but on something
specific about their nature, that which makes them international crimes at
least in an abstract way in the first place. If one were to enrich the parame-
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ters of that ownership beyond the idea that certain international crimes are
more "international" than others, and seek specifically international elements of a "nexus," I would argue that three complex factors should be
taken into account in assessing the legitimacy of the international community's assertion of jurisdiction. First, to what extent were the international
community and the values and ideas it stands for affected as such by the
commission of the crimes in question? This is essentially the transnational/multinational/universal component of the crimes in question. Second, to what extent did the crimes occur as a result of breakdowns in the
fabric of international solidarity? For example, was there a lapse in peace
maintenance or diplomatic miscommunication? Third, to what extent
would the repetition of such crimes endanger the international community
as such because, for example, the international community has since
vouched its credibility on the nonrepetition of such crimes (e.g. the
Holocaust)?
There is clearly never going to be anything remotely approaching a
strict equivalence between the fact that crimes are international and the
possibility that they be tried internationally. But while there will be crimes
that clearly, on balance, belong more to the domestic sphere than the international, there will also be crimes where a sort of "surplus" of internationality will justify some internationalization--regardless of the issue of
whether domestic courts are functional or not. The idea of "ownership"
also allows us to transcend one of the apparent limitations of jurisdiction,
in that the idea of ownership lends itself well to the possibility of dual or
multiple ownership. This opens up the possibility, to which we will return
later, that institutional ways may be sought that make sense of the fact that
international crimes are both international and domestic.
IV.

A Representational Theory of International Criminal Trials

In view of such a conception of "ownership" of international criminal
law trials, what institutional setup might most make sense of the respective
claims of the international and the national over a given crime? The difficulties encountered in addressing this sort of question have to do with the
problem of defining the purpose of trials of international crimes.
The problem with much of the rhetoric surrounding international
criminal justice is that it has been focussed on outcome (the repression of
given criminals, the fight against impunity, the establishment of the foundations for a new political regime) 2 7 rather than process. Most of the justifications of international criminal justice insist on results flowing from the
verdict and beyond: retribution, deterrence, reconciliation, compensation,
and closure. Typically, the emphasis has been on the ability of any given
27. 1 find echoes of this finding in Ruti Teitel's thinking about transitional justice:

"The leading argument for punishment in periods of political flux is consequentialist
and forward-looking ....
At these times in a variant of the conventional 'utilitarian'
justification for punishment, the basis for punishment is its contribution to the social
good." TEITEL, supra note 2, at 28, 30.
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mechanism to achieve successful prosecutions that would lead to those
desired results.
In doing so, ideas about international criminal justice have also taken
a significant turn towards the functionalist. If what matters is outcome,
then the way in which that outcome is reached is in and by itself indifferent. Functionalism causes one to treat international and domestic courts
as functional equivalents for the purposes of achieving the goal of repressing
internationalcrimes. This, then, is what makes the discourse of criminal
repression all the more vulnerable or sensitive to the need to respect state
sovereignty: if no specific interest is served by having international trials,
for example, except to remedy a state's judicial failure, then the international community might as well respect sovereignty which at least is a significant value in its own right. The goal of international criminal justice
becomes the repression of international criminals in the most efficient possible way compatible with the smallest encroachment of state sovereignty.
But a case can also be made that trials do not simply or even principally lead to convictions and that trials are instead about process, or at least
about a very indirect genus of outcomes. What is excluded by the focus on
outcome is what I would call the symbolic, aesthetic, or communicative
function of trials. Although deterrence, for example, still features quite
prominently among the defences of international criminal justice, the more
sophisticated scholarship has evolved (following a move made a long time
ago in domestic criminal law jurisprudence) to conceptualizing the role of
international criminal law much more in Durkheimian terms as reinforcing social solidarity. Essentially, criminal law is seen as part of a complex
theatralization of society by itself, where society affirms what it is by
designating its opposite. Criminal law is society-constituting in that it reinforces the fundamental status of certain norms that the society considers
central. Rather than an outcome, trials are a process of constituting the
social. And if ordinary criminal trials are foundational, then transitional
28
trials are even more so.

In international criminal justice this is a uniquely difficult exercise
precisely because it is never quite clear--it is indeed quite contentious--to
what society international criminal justice refers back. The difference
between international criminal law and domestic criminal law is that the
latter clearly points back to a social system (the domestic polity), while the
former refers ambiguously back to various systems, both domestic and
international, one of whose existence (the international) is itself a matter
of some conjecture. But this process of implicit societal designation is also
a vital exercise that cannot be avoided because, far beyond the contingent
outcome of any given trial, defining the border between the national and
the international, the universal and the sovereign, and in the process constituting communities of suffering and fate is precisely what international
criminaljustice is about. Even more so than in domestic justice, the foundational purpose of international criminal justice is the definition/delimita28.

Id. at 29.
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tion/affirmation of political community, even though the resulting political
community may be one that is both exclusive and inclusive, localized and
immaterial.
One crucial function of international criminal trials, therefore, should
be to "represent" the nature of the crimes they are judging, by designating
and acknowledging the communities that are being affected by them. This
designation is a function that trials of international criminals fulfil by what
they do (and I have hinted in passing how domestic and international
courts may respectively be better at stressing the domestic-international
connotation of the crimes they are judging), but also merely by what they
are. In that respect, international and domestic trials are precisely not
functional equivalents and do send very different signals. Drawing inspiration from McLuhan's famous aphorism, I would argue that "the medium is
the message": international and domestic trials, simply by virtue of being
what they are, send profoundly different messages about what they are
doing--even as they are supposed (according to the complementarity
dogma) to be doing exactly the same thing. They "represent" the normative environment from which they are supposed to have sprung. By virtue
of a trial being held internationally, one sends a strong signal that a norm
has been offended that is properly considered international and in some
peculiar way offends the dignity of mankind. In fact, one sends a strong
signal that the international community is ultimately the community of
reference for international crimes, the yardstick of universalized understanding of the abominable. By virtue of a trial being organized domestically, one solidifies the vision of certain crimes being above all anchored in
a domestic trajectory--which they may well be in certain circumstances
and deserve to be treated as such. It is through such assertions that the
complex texture of a world that is both domestic and international is being
weaved. Herein lies the representationalfunction of criminal justice.
V.

Primacy and Complementarity vs. Hybridity

How might a representational theory of international criminal justice
actually work institutionally? The short answer is to insist, as General
Nikitchenko, the Soviet representative to the London Conference that preceded Nuremberg did, that "local crimes should be tried locally"'2 9 and,
therefore, conversely, that, as J. A. Roux put it, "[tjo international crimes
30
must correspond an international jurisdiction."
The problem is that in the real world, as I hope to have shown, there
are few crimes that will be totally international and few crimes that will be
totally domestic. Most crimes will clearly be a mix of both, and it will
rarely be clear where the balance stands. For example, a pattern of criminal behaviour will have had domestic roots and will have led to political
29. JACKSON, supra note 24, at 158.
30. Quoted in Report of the InternationalLaw Commission on the Question of International CriminalJurisdiction,U.N. GAOR 5th Sess., at 124, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/15 (1950)
(translated from the original in French).
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repression at home, but also possibly have led to an aggressive war against
another state which will have led to crimes against humanity or genocide
against a group that straddles borders.
In such circumstances, the risk is that trials by exclusively domestic or
international courts will require us to choose too much. If a purely international option is chosen, the risk is that the domestic dimension of a
crime and the domestic impact of the trial will be reduced. If a domestic
trial is chosen, in certain specific cases, a crucial international dimension
may well be lost. In both cases, if an individual is tried either domestically
or internationally, that means that he or she will never be tried internationally or domestically respectively. In responding to this problem, the international community in recent years has been pursuing two tracks whose
subtle tensions and incompatibilities are often overlooked but which I
would argue stand for two fundamentally different ways of dealing with the
challenge of "representing" international criminality.
Primacy and complementarity is a first track pursued by the international community. Primacy and complementarity are generally contrasted
as evidencing fairly opposite visions of the problem of which type of court
is best suited to deal with international crimes. Both certainly represent
fairly opposite ends of the spectrum on the issue of how to address the
issue of allocation of cases. 3 1 But for our purposes, both are also profoundly similar in that both adopt a very either/or approach to the problem
of which courts should judge crimes of international law. The non bis in
idem principle effectively ensures that a crime tried by an international
court cannot then be tried domestically and, with some caveats, vice versa.
Both complementarity and primacy therefore force the international community to choose between domestic and international trials, even though
in so doing they do violence to the dual nature of international crimes.
Rather than reducing the problem of the dual domestic/international
nature of international crimes and international criminal justice's apparent
inability to ever fully apprehend both, primacy and complementarity condition the very problem that they claim to resolve.
How can one transcend that dichotomy? One solution is to introduce
occasional correctives to it. As far as the use of primacy is concerned,
there has been a significant effort by the ICTY in recent years, as part of its
termination strategy, to create the conditions where it would become possible to defer cases "back" to Bosnian courts in particular. This can be seen
as part of an at least symbolic recognition of the "ownership" by Bosnian
society of some cases that have cruelly impacted it. Intense outreach campaigns by both tribunals also try to deal with the distance created by their
31. 1 say "fairly" because, of course, complementarity is not the symmetrical
equivalent of primacy for domestic courts. A regime of exclusive and final "priority" of
domestic courts (leaving to the international only those cases that sovereigns directly
referred to it or possibly that no sovereign wanted to try) would be that. Complementarity is still in the end tilted towards the international which has the last say, at least in
some circumstances. By the same token, it is also of course much more "sovereign leaning" than primacy.
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absorption of leading cases at the expense of affected societies' needs,
although outreach efforts often seem spurred more by a diffuse feeling of
guilt than a real commitment to throw one's lot behind transitional
endeavours. As far as moderating the effect of complementarity, Bill
Burke-White is one of the few to have argued, albeit only really in passing,
that there might be two exceptions to the priority of domestic trials, which
he describes as the "Kunarac" and "Milo~evit exceptions." These correspond more or less to the two principal grounds that I have identified,
short of a failure of domestic courts, for a trial to be held internationally.
The "Kunarac exception," by the name of the first ICTY case involving
prosecution of rape as a crime against humanity, refers to the idea that
"[wihere a case is of groundbreaking precedential value, a supranational
court may yield better jurisprudence. In such cases, experience and judicial resources may be required in order to ensure the codification of crucial
areas of international criminal law."' 32 According to the Milogevit exception, "[wihere a globally renowned despot is tried for international crimes,
33
the world at large may have an interest in supranational prosecution.
There is some merit to these suggestions and one can see how, had the
mood at the Rome Conference been more subtly inclined, the Rome Statute
could have incorporated them without relinquishing the spirit of complementarity. As far as the "Kunarac exception" is concerned, a procedure
similar to that by which cases before the European Court of Human Rights
are deferred to the grand chamber on account of its legal importance could
have been contemplated (the court is deemed best suited to make decisions
where the issue is one of evaluation of the law). 3 4 As far as the "Milogevit

exception" is concerned, one could have imagined a mechanism by which
the Assembly of state parties, as the governing body of the court and its
political "conscience" could, by a certain clear majority, have decided that
by virtue of its sheer transnational, global or universal importance, a case
could be declared ipso facto receivable regardless of the functioning of
domestic courts. It probably says a lot about the rigidity of complementar32. Burke-White, supra note 6, at 93.
33. Id.
34. Article 30 of the European Convention on Human Rights dictates the conditions
for "[rlelinquishment of jurisdiction to the Grand Chamber" as follows:
Where a case pending before a Chamber raises a serious question affecting the
interpretation of the Convention or the protocols thereto, or where the resolution of a question before the Chamber might have a result inconsistent with a
judgment previously delivered by the Court, the Chamber may, at any time
before it has rendered its judgment, relinquish jurisdiction in [favor] of the
Grand Chamber, unless one of the parties to the case objects.
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
art. 30, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, available at http://www.
echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/D5CC24A7-DC13-4318-B457-5C9014916D7A/0/English
Anglais.pdf (emphasis added). One might imagine a mechanism whereby an international criminal tribunal could make that determination itself, or at least one where
domestic courts feeling they had inherited a case that was too "big" for them could use
an expedited procedure to forfeit jurisdiction in favor of the international tribunal.
Alternatively, a referral system similar to the one existing with the European Court of
Justice might go a long way to reducing risks of discrepancies.
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ity that such exceptions were not even contemplated. However, although
the varied correctives outlined above create new and subtle ways to deal
with the dichotomy, they still seem to accept it as inevitable, something
which I am inclined to think it is not.
Hybrid tribunals are of course living proof of this. The dichotomy
between international and domestic trials only arises as a result of these
being considered as alternatives. To the extent that tribunals can be created that are somehow both domestic and international, the dichotomy
vanishes.
There is of course nothing new about presenting hybrid tribunals as
an option in the international community's toolkit to deal with problems of
international crimes. But to my knowledge, there has been little awareness
that there may be a deeper contradiction about a system that simultaneously promotes complementarity or hybridity as the ways of the future. In
the sort of quasi-euphoric discourse about a "community" 3 5 of international institutions devoted to international criminal justice, hybrid tribunals are often presented as one in many institutional innovations 3 6 but
without much thought as to how they might potentially reflect a fundamentally different vision of international criminal justice. My first contention
is that hybridity's relationship to the primacy/complementarity duo is
more problematic than it looks, because hybridity threatens to deconstruct
the false dichotomy of international/domestic trials in which the international community has trapped itself.
Furthermore and more interestingly, there has not been a vigorous
normative defense of hybrid tribunals on the grounds that I suggest,
namely that hybrid tribunals make more sense of the complex representational functions of international criminal justice. 3 7 Typically, hybridity is
sometimes presented as a concession to what may be obtainable from a
sovereign state in the absence of a Security Council resolution, or as a second best solution born from "tribunal fatigue." Alternatively, hybridity is
defended on purely functional grounds, either as a manifestation of the
international community's concern for due process, as a more cost-efficient solution, or as one that will be more "legitimate" domestically. 3 8 But
there is little hint that hybridity might be something profoundly desirable nor35. See Burke-White, supra note 6, at 3.
36. Suzanne Katzenstein describes hybrid tribunals as "one of the latest attempts to
seek justice for crimes of mass atrocity." Suzanne Katzenstein, Note, Hybrid Tribunals:
Searchingfor Justice in East Timor, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 245, 245 (2003); see also Laura
A. Dickinson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 295, 308 (2003) (pointing
out that hybrid tribunals "complement" international and domestic tribunals).
Although that is undeniably true in practice, this "soft" compatibility discourse does not
particularly highlight the fact that, at a conceptual level, hybrid tribunals also contradict
some of the conceptual premises of the opposition between domestic and international
tribunals.
37. For example, Dickinson concentrates, as with the disadvantages and advantages
of purely domestic and purely international trials, on the fact that hybrid tribunals may
have more legitimacy and offer more prospects for capacity building and norm penetration. Dickinson, supra note 36, at 306-08.
38. See generally Katzenstein, supra note 36.
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matively as such, over and above, for example, a regime such as
complementarity.
I argue, on the contrary, that the great merit of hybrid tribunals is that
they deal with the artificial distinction between the domestic and the international by simply collapsing it. Rather than asking crimes to fit their perspective, they (ideally) mold themselves into the shape of the crimes they
are judging. As a result, they are the institutional mechanism that makes
most sense of the dual nature of international crimes as both domestic and
international and our intuition that one of the primary functions of international criminal trials is to echo/reverberate/constitute that underlying
reality. Hybrid tribunals can be seen as sophisticated attempts at striking
the best possible balance between the competing pulls of sovereignty and
universalism in a way that maximizes the "representational" function of
international criminal justice.
Although both the existing hybrid tribunals--the Cambodian
Extraordinary Chambers and the Special Court for Sierra Leone--are
probably above all a result of the pull and shove of international political
negotiations, they can be analyzed in this way. The Cambodian genocide
was, as already suggested, primarily a domestic genocide, borne from the
nihilist folly of a totalitarian regime. At the same time, a purely domestic
trial would not have done justice to the fact that, as one of only a handful
of genocides in the 20th century, the Cambodian killing fields also belong
to world history in their own right. The presence of international judges
flags that interest, just as it sends the message that norms fundamental to
humanity were offended in Cambodia.
The international connection in the case of Sierra Leone is even more
obvious. The conflict involved several countries, most notoriously Liberia
but also a peacekeeping mission such as the Economic Community of West
African States Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). Many of the
problems that it raises, for example the use of child soldiers, are universal
issues in much need of an international response. As one of the worst state
breakdowns of the 1990's in a continent fraught with conflict, the conflict
raises the issue of the United Nations' credibility in dealing with endemic
ethnic strife. For the international community not to get minimally
involved in the trials would send the wrong signal and open it up to accusations of double standards (if Rwanda, why not Sierra Leone?). 3 9 By the
same token, it would be wrong to underestimate the extent to which Sierra
Leone is also above all a domestic conflict created by the uninterrupted
coups and ethnic strife.
The Sierra Leone Special Court and the Cambodian Extraordinary
Chambers reflect this assessment about the competing international and
local interests involved adequately, if perhaps fortuitously. The fact that
the Sierra Leone Special Court is clearly a little more on the international
39. See Burke-White, supra note 6, at 24 ("internationalized domestic courts can
demonstrate the general global consensus that international crimes will not be
tolerated").
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side institutionally than the Extraordinary Chambers, for example, can be
seen as premised on an analysis (in the details of which I will not go) that
the Cambodian genocide was probably more of a domestic matter than the
war in Sierra Leone was.
VI.

An Analysis of the Hussein and Milogevit Trials in Light of the
Representational Theory

I now turn to the issue of the trials of Milogevit and Hussein, knowing
full well that these are cases where the international community has made
its choices about whether to turn to domestic or international trials. What
kind of normative critique can the representational theory of trials of international criminals nonetheless yield?
A. The Trial of Slobodan Milogevie
Let us first look at the trial of Milogevi&. This is a case where trial by
an international criminal tribunal, via the medium of primacy, was
favored. This is largely because a Security Council resolution simply gave
the ICTY the possibility of ignoring the functioning of domestic courts, but
also because in all likelihood domestic courts were not or have been, at any
point since the creation of the ICTY, sufficiently functional to handle such
a case. But a broader, more principled defense of the internationalization
of the Miloevi trial, even in the event that domestic courts had been functioning, can be made on "representational" grounds. There are, for example, many clearly transnational and multinational elements in the crimes
that Miloevi is accused of, such as the commission of acts of genocide or
crimes against humanity in territories and against nationals of other states.
In fact, Milogevit probably committed few crimes that an international
criminal tribunal could hear against nationals of or on the territory of Serbia alone.
Had Milogevi been tried in Bosnia, for example, and apart from the
fact that there would always have been suspicions of partiality, it is highly
probable that he would have been tried for the crimes that he committed
there, rather than the crimes he committed in Croatia or Kosovo. Purely
from the point of view of avoiding conflicts of jurisdiction, a trial by an
international criminal tribunal was preferable to one by one of the successor states to the former Yugoslavia (assuming that domestic courts had
been willing and able). Thanks to the trial being conducted internationally, the prosecutor of the ICTY managed to obtain the merging of three
acts of accusation (Kosovo, Croatia and Bosnia) so that a much stronger
sense of the connection of these events emerges. In addition, the sheer
magnitude of the crimes committed by Milogevit, the involvement of the
international community in the conflict almost from the start, and his
overall responsibility as head of state in a situation that not only massively
destabilized international peace and security but also reawakened the specter of genocide in Europe would on their own make the Milogevit case an
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ideal case for internationalization. 40 It would have been wrong to entirely
deny that dimension by entrusting the trial to functioning domestic courts
in the former Yugoslavia (had they existed).
By the same token, clearly something is missed by having a purely
international trial. One can see an international trial as the price that has
to be paid for conducting successful prosecutions in a situation where little
could be expected of domestic courts, but that is still a price to pay. The
entire origin and context of the commission of crimes by Milogevit is in
political projects and ambitions nurtured in Serbia. The Republic of Yugoslavia to this day continues to be heavily penalized by the legacy of the
crimes that were committed by his regime. The key to the Republic's future
and its capacity to move ahead lies in a thorough understanding of what
led to the regime and what the responsibilities are in allowing crimes to be
committed, something which an international tribunal can only partially
achieve. Indeed, the fact that the trial is being conducted internationally
may make it easier for sectors of Yugoslav society to present it as "foreign"
or "exterior," thus effectively deferring the time of reckoning. It is therefore
also profoundly problematic that the trial is not, in any distinct way, also
"domestic."
Specifically, it is problematic that, as a result of primacy being what it
is, there has been no measure or even possibility of hybridization of the
Milogevit trial. This is not simply for the reason that local expertise might
have helped the judges in understanding the complexities of the domestic
situation, or for the instrumental reason that a hybrid tribunal would have
more legitimacy domestically (even though both these reasons are valid). It
is more fundamentally because, by extracting completely the crimes committed from the reach of domestic appropriation, a crucial dimension of
Milo~evit's criminal enterprise is neglected. The risk is that the crimes will
be performatively misportrayed as crimes committed in an international
abstraction rather than crimes rooted in a particular societal failure.
Rather than trial solely by the ICTY, therefore, and from an ideal normative point of view, some intermediary solution involving Balkanic
judges and perhaps the occasional application of Yugoslav law would have
made more sense of what international criminal justice is trying to achieve.
B. The Trial of Saddam Hussein
If we look at the trial of Saddam Hussein, the image is initially the
reverse since the starting point is the decision to prosecute the former Iraqi
dictator before a domestic tribunal. The decision to have a domestic trial
was largely based on political, pragmatic, and policy grounds although
there is also probably a sense that, in application of the fundamental idea
of complementarity, it makes sense for revamped domestic courts to be
given the first try at prosecuting crimes for which they would normally
have jurisdiction.
40. In this I am only making the case that the "Milogevik exception" (see supra note
19), as it were, actually works in the case of Milogevi.
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But a more principled defence of some measure of domesticization
can be made. There is an obvious and strong Iraqi interest in the crimes of
Saddam Hussein being tried in Iraq. Iraqis have suffered greatly at the
hands of Saddam Hussein. The massacre of Halabja alone made 5,000 casualties. A trial in Iraq is meant to make a point about the new Iraq and its
willingness to move on to a society based on accountability. In that sense,
the trial of Saddam Hussein can properly be said to "belong" to Iraqi society, and a domestic trial makes ample sense.
But the danger is that the specifically international dimension of Hussein's trial will be minimized. The crimes committed by Saddam Hussein
clearly have a strong international dimension both in the "transnational"
and "universal" sense. Saddam Hussein is on the wanted list of at least two
countries where his acts caused utter devastation: Iran and Kuwait. In
addition, Iraqi troops under Hussein's command are responsible for war
crimes committed against Coalition soldiers during the first and second
Gulf War. A trial in Iraq means, first, that these other states will in all
likelihood never get to try him, and, second, that these crimes are likely to
be given comparatively short shrift. In fact, unsurprisingly enough, and
although the invasion of Kuwait is included in the court's jurisdiction, the
indictment of Hussein does not include the aggression of Iran in 1980, nor
does it include the use of gas against the Iranians, even though this can be
seen as a rehearsal for the much later use of gas against Iraqi Kurds. Even
if these crimes had been included, however, it is difficult not to see how a
domestic Iraqi court would have been an exceedingly odd place to try
them, and how the outcome might not have been heavily tilted towards an
Iraqi understanding of these events, even if principles of judicial impartiality and independence had been respected.
In addition, many of Saddam's crimes were committed in clear and
explicit defiance of international law and the norms of the international
community, at times in a way that specifically seemed to challenge these
norms' very existence--surely a ground for the international community
to intervene. The massacre of Halabja alone, even though it was committed
entirely domestically, must surely count as one of the most horrifying acts
of barbarity of the twentieth century, one of the few instances of gas being
used massively against a civilian population, something that the international community as such has a keen interest in repressing diligently.
These arguments militate in favor of what would have been at least a
partial internationalization of the Hussein trial, not one that would have
compromised the status of the trial as an at least partly domestic one, but
one that would have impressed the importance of the international community as a stakeholder in the trial, for example through the presence of
international judges.
Conclusion
There is no easy answer to the question of who should try crimes of
international law. The absence of any strict legal principle means that for
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the most part the scholar must resort to a more thorough normative analysis of the goals pursued by trials of international crimes in general. Either
purely domestic or purely international trials seem to miss an important
dimension of international criminality. If the goal of international trials
were simply to prosecute individuals successfully then that would not particularly be a problem. But I have tried to argue that the real goal of international criminal justice, apart from sending people to jail, is to make a
more symbolic case about the nature and existence of society that gave rise
to the norms. If that is so, then the crucial issue becomes that of defining
who has a better "ownership" claim to any given criminal episode. The role
of trials of international criminals, from thereon, is to give the best "representation" possible of that sense of respective ownership. Complementarity and primacy do not really help us in solving this dilemma: they are the
dilemma itself in that they construe the debate in entirely either/or terms.
Hybridity, in this respect, deserves a more principled and scholarly
defence than it has garnered so far as a way of thinking about these issues.
On the one hand, it is profoundly at odds with complementarity and primacy, but on the other hand, it seems to be the best way of giving subtle
recognition that one community's claim of ownership does not cancel
another's and showing that international crimes are always in a meaningful
way both domestic and international.
In this light, both the Milogevik and Hussein trials could have gained
significantly from being organized in a more hybrid fashion, weaving
together these two constitutive narratives of international criminal justice.

